Sandia National Laboratories, the nation's nuclear ordnance laboratory, is operated on a no-profit, no-fee basis by AT&T Technologies, Inc. as a prime contractor for the Department of Energy. This unique arrangement began in 1949 when President Harry Truman personally requested that AT&T assume management of the nuclear weapons laboratory as a service in the national interest. The story of how this unusual relationship came about makes for an interesting chapter in the annals of US legal and institutional history. This report describes the historical background, politicai negotiations, and prime contract provisos that established the legal framework for the Labs.
Introduction
In that first decade following World War 11,the President of the United States and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) faced what they perceived as an increasingly ominous threat to the national security of the United States. Several significant events-from the Berlin Crisis to the detonation of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949-coalesced to convince policy planners that staying ahead of the Russians meant staying ahead in the arms race. In the interim, there was legitimate concern about the status of the US stockpile. 1 A series of visits to the nation's weapons laboratories during 1946 and 1947 brought government officials to Sandia Base on the desert outskirts of Albuquerque, New Mexico. There, in 1945 , Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory had established a small assembly and production operation. "Z Division," as the contingent was known, began the job of assembling and producing components and case parts for the first atomic bombs. The facility was far from impressive. 2 Overall, according to AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal: "The result of these inspections was a shock. The substantial stockpile of atom bombs we and the top military assumed was there, in readiness, did not exist." 3 The most basic problem, as Lilienthal and the commissioners acknowledged, was to redesign the bomb into a genuine field weapon. What they needed, Lilienthal said, was "not something that could be done in a laboratory alone, but in a production center, with . . . factory management." They realized, too, the need for technical experience in dealing with weapons systems and weapon development; what they envisioned was a "team working together as a unit." 4
At the Sandia facility, the Commission had the semblance of a team, and one with assembly expertise; Z-Division personnel had the technical experience, but they lacked an effective organizational structure and a functioning production center. To meet these deficiencies, the AEC took a series of major steps involving the interaction of science, government, and industry. First, however, much high-level negotiating had to take place as a prelude to establishing the legal framework for operations.
President Truman Intercedes
On April 1, 1948 , in an attempt to solve organizational problems, Z Division was declared a separate branch of Los Alamos. 5 The University of California, which managed the Los Alamos Laboratory, had neverbeen pleased with the de facto, but informal, extension of its contract to manage the ordnance facility at Sandia Base. The reorganization, therefore, provided the opportune time for the University to formally request release from its management responsibilities. An academic institution, the Board of Regents claimed, should not be associated with ordnance activities during peacetime.' Scientists making up the Technical Board at Los Alamos also favored breaking ties with Sandia, maintaining that the operation would be strengthened by bringing to it "engineering and . . . commercial administration which the University is . . . not equipped to provide." 7 A study conducted by Mervin Kelly, Executive Vice President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, at the request of the AEC and the Military Establishment, substantiated these opinions. Although various firms were considered, Lilienthal as spokesman for the AEC and representatives of the Military, on May 10, 1949, recommended that American Telephone and Telegraph (the Bell System) assume the task.6 AT&T-with its strong manufacturing arm, Western Electric, and the research orientation of Bell Telephone Laboratories-they felt would provide the right industrial combination for the management of a Laboratory of vital interest to the national defense.
It was decided also that Lilienthal should enlist the aid of President Harry Truman. "After careful consideration," Lilienthal wrote the President, "we believe it would be most valuable in approaching that organization [Bell Telephone Laboratories] and its parent organization, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, if you would indicate a personal interest in the matter." 9 Attached to the memo were drafts of letters for the President to consider. All were similar in content, but the one Truman selected was well-phrased, succinct, and to-the-point.
The President acted quickly. In letters dated , he informed AT&T President, Leroy Wilson, and Bell Telephone President, Oliver E. Buckley, that the AEC planned to ask the Bell System to accept direction of the Sandia Laboratory at Albuquerque, New Mexico. At stake was not only the successful operation of a small ordnance and assembly facility located in the Southwestern outback, but also the growth and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Four days later, Wilson replied. He promised to give the matter "prompt and sympathetic consideration," although he had not yet heard from the Atomic Energy Commission, nor did he know the "details of the problem." Buckley also responded positively and promptly. As a member of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, he was well aware of the circumstances leading to the request for changeover. He promised to give "full consideration and weight to the importance and urgency of the project in light of the situation as I have come to understand it.
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On Memorial Day, May 30, 1949, Lilienthal, Carroll Wilson, and Director of the Division of Military Application (DMA), General James McCormack, met the AT&T President at his home to discuss the matter further. At this meeting, Wilson expressed concern about the pending antitrust suit against AT&T, which had been filed January 14, 1949 , under the Sherman Antitrust Act. How could one reconcile being asked to do the job suggested when the Justice Department was trying to break up the very combination that made it so suitable for the task? There was a certain logic in the AT&T position. Wilson wanted assurance that the Bell System's acceptance of the charge would not add fuel to the fire and be held against them. His point was well taken.12 The matter would have to be resolved.
In the discussion that followed, the question of fee was also an issue. There were overtones of the "Merchants of Death" stigma. Like DuPont, AT&T cof.dd suffer from adverse publicity if the Bell System reaped a profit from a weapons operation. Provided with assurances and having lessened the potential of disadvantages for AT&T, Leroy Wilson on July 1, 1949, formally accepted the contract for operation of the Sandia Laboratory. In his letter of understanding and confirmation, he explained for the record the Bell System's rationale for accepting the task and his position on the antitrust suit. "The Bell System," he said, "has always stood ready to do its part in the national defense by undertaking work for which it is particularly fitted." He agreed that the Bell System and its methods of operation gave them the special qualifications required. "For these reasons," he stated, "we are willing to undertake the project. " 19 It has been suggested that the Bell System's major motive in assuming responsibility for the management of Sandia was to obtain a favorable position in the antitrust litigation.20 As numerous references to the issue indicate, Wilson did seek early assurance that the government would not use the existence of an AEC/AT&T contract to establish its case in court. Wilson obviously viewed his efforts on AT&T's behalf as a leadership obligation. Yet, there were other determining factors, for example, the System's long history of service in the public interest. Management of the nation's ordnance lab certainly fell into that category as Truman had clearly stated. Furthermore, much as AT&T has downplayed its contribution to US defense efforts, a study of its activities during wartime, reveals the System's major involvement.21 And, finally, there was also common logic in the official AT&T position on the antitrust suit as it related to the government's request to manage Sandia.
The suit did have its ironic aspects. Wilson, in his letter of confirmation iterated concerns voiced earlier to Lilienthal and McCormack: "The antitrust suit brought by the Department of Justice last January," he pointed out, "seeks to terminate the very same Western Electric-Bell Laboratories-Bell System relationship which gives our organization the unique qualifications to which you refer." A contract with Western Electric to operate Sandia would not change Western's relationship with Bell Laboratories. " [Western] and the Bell Laboratories," he added, "would indeed work as one, as they do now in Bell System affairs, and the effectiveness of their work would depend, as we have explained to you that it always has, upon their close connection as units of the Bell System." 22In essence, the antitrust suit could destroy the very combination that made the Bell System the best qualified for the management job. There was a definite validity in the AT&T argument.
If indeed AT&T officials truly expected the Justice Department to lay aside its suit against them as a tradeoff for accepting management of Sandia Laboratory, they were to be woefully disappointed. Even AT&T's request for a postponement of prosecution of the suit would be denied, although a de facto postponement until 1951 did occur. Through the years, the Department of Defense would become AT&T's ally in the ensuing antitrust battles.
After extensive legal wrangling, AT&T in 1956 would be forced into signing a Consent Decree imposing strict regulatory measures. Once again, however, the Bell System would retain Western Electric, despite the Justice Department's desire to have the manufacturing company broken up into three independent and competing firms. Then, in 1979, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MClj won a $600 million award that would have been tripled, according to antitrust law, if the courts had not reversed their decision. Thus, by the late 1970s, MCI'S competitive crusade was gaining ground in the courts, thereby paving the way for dissolution of the Bell System.23
In 1949, however, the Bell System reacted according to its fundamental legacy of meeting the national need, and divestiture was postponed. By accepting management of Sandia Laboratory, AT&T, because of the nature of its contract, had little to gain except governmental good will. Sandia, on the other hand, after the inevitable period of adjustment, would thrive under Bell System leadership and expertise. And in the broader view, the entire nation would profit from a drastically improved defense posture. Although critics would view the AEC-AT&T association as the epitome of the controversial "military-industrial complex," others would consider the Bell System affiliation as "a leading national defense asset." 24But how did this marriage of the military, engineering, science, and industry come about?
Laying the Legal Groundwork
The nation learned of plans for the transfer on July 12, 1949 . A New York Thnes article, based upon an AEC announcement from Washington, succinctly explained a part of the rationale for transfer, namely, the growth of Sandia Laboratory which, according to the announcement, "has been the result of the Commission's effort to integrate research, development, and production activities in accordance with the best academic and industrial practice and with the most competent available supervision in each technical area." 25What the press release did not mention, however, was that the change in management also signified the Commission's recognition of Sandia as the hub of the developing defense complex and the overriding desire of the AEC to ensure the continued mobilization of science in the name of national readiness.
As a preliminary step, the AEC dispatched a special team of officials from Western, Bell, and the AEC to Sandia to initiate the transfer.2b Lilienthal, in a letter to Senator Brien McMahon, explained that the group would be studying requirements of the project and "laying the groundwork for early consummation of a contract for operation of the Laboratory." This task force would be involved in the first of a series of negotiations in which government and corporation, in the words of author John Brooks, "played a game of cat and mouse." 27
The representatives flew to Albuquerque on a Special Mission aircraft. A photograph published in the Albuquerque papers on July 14, 1949, showed The issue of fee surfaced again. McCormack felt that a fee should be levied so the "AEC could criticize (the) operation and make AT&T pay for blunders." But Lack held firm to the AT&T position of "no-profit-nofee." Lack also wanted "good industrial practices" inserted in the terminology rather than a specific cost section. He posited that AT&T, in exchange for no fee, should have the freedom to operate within these broad limits. Sandia's general counsel, Kimball Prince, explained the terminology saying that it would "assure the flexibility deemed necessary to accomplish the tasks in a new frontier of science, as well as provide a criterion against which Sandia's operations could be measured." 30 A precedent for the no-fee, no-profit contract had been established by the AEC'S contract for the operation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory with Associated Universities, Inc. Under the no-profit arrangement, the contractor was to be reimbursed for all costs and expenses, direct or indirect, resulting from work under the contract. Paragraph 3, Article IV of the contract proved to be significant in the negotiation of other contracts, including the one for Sandia. Thinking ahead, the Commission, in January of 1948, had proposed to use a provision similar to that specific paragraph in the drafting of other noprofit contracts for research and development work where reimbursement on an actual cost basis appeared to be advisable.31
Less similar in provision was the cost-plusfixed-fee arrangement between General Electric and E. 1. DuPont de Nemours to carry out a contract for certain production, research, construction, and maintenance services connected with the Commission's installations at Hanford, Washington, and Schenectady, New York.32 The Western contract draft, as initially submitted by the AEC on August 2, was more similar to the one negotiated by the AEC with Bendix for operation of Project Royal. Like the Bendix contract, it contained a detailed "Cost of Work" clause and a fairly broad indemnity except for "willful misconduct or bad faith." Lack, however, advised the AEC that the Bendix-style contract was unacceptabielargely because of the detail.
The rather general requirement that the Corporation should be run on the basis of "good industrial practice," was duly passed on to Western and became the central theme of the contract, as originally signed. Later, this phrase was changed to adopt "Western practices" as the criteria. 33 Norris Bradbury had his own suggestions regarding the transfer.34 His comments, along with others, were discussed in a series of meetings that took negotiators from high-rise offices in New York to the mountains of Los Alamos, New Mexico, and on to Bendix, Kansas City. In addition to contract particulars, the division of responsibilities and procedures for review and handling of production schedules and procurement policies had to be established. -129-11-789 Prime Contract Provisions
As formalized, the prime contract between Western Electric, Sandia Corporation, and the AEC and Western Electric was an unusual indirectly, Bell Telephone Laboratories. Since document. Not only did it employ the concept Western and AT&T shared ownership of Bell of no-profit, no-fee and the liberal Labs, the signatories of the prime contract parameters of "good industrial practice," but it were necessarily the AEC and Western was a tripartite agreement involving the AEC, Electric. However, Sandia and the AEC fully expected to benefit from the expertise of both concerns. As stipulated in the contract:
The In this manner the contract provided for the loan of management and technical personnel from the Bell System to Sandia. If, for example, Sandia needed a technical, financial, purchasing, or accounting expert, or a general manager for overall corporate administration, the Bell System would provide such abilities from any part of its nationwide operations until such time as those services were no longer needed. Not long after Sandia came under AT&T management, it was recognized that full-time legal counsel would be necessary. Phillip Wesson assisted during the transition; then, in March 1950, Frank L. Dewey was transferred to Sandia from Western Electric to serve as the Corporation's first on-roll attorney.
Through the years, the roster of Bell System people at Sandia has varied. On November 1, 1949, when Sandia had 1742 employees, the number of Bell people transferred or loaned to Sandia stood at 14. By April 1953, the number was approximately 70, but in 1987 with Sandia rolls registering 8200, personnel affiliated with AT&T numbered 13.40 Bell Lab transfers, in 1949 as in 1987, were well represented in the upper echelons of management since Western has under its contract a broad trusteeship over Sandia. Seven of Sandia's presidents have come from Bell, with only two, George Landry and Siegmund P. In addition to specifying provisions for the sharing of professional and scientific expertise, the Western-AEC contract also provided for broad indemnification, one of the most carefully analyzed topics of discussion during contract negotiations. Admittedly, the work specified under the contract involved the potential of "unusual, unpredictable and abnormal risks"-a fact recognized by all parties. Section 6 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 authorized the Commission to produce atomic weapons. Moreover, Congress had passed the Act knowing that atomic weapons had been and were to be produced by contractors. Therefore, as Secretary Phillip D. Wesson explained to Brown: "The indemnity agreement is not technically an independent commitment, but . . . is . . . nothing more than a reasonable and necessary incidental feature of the basic relationship arising from the cost plus fee arrangement wherein the contractor in effect is an agency or instrumentality of the Government." 42Since they would be acting, in effect, as an instrument of the government, Western, Sandia Corporation, and Bell Laboratories insisted upon an exemption from liability and damages including the expense of litigation arising from injuries, deaths, or damages to property arising from or connected with the work.
To obtain such legal dispensation, Sumner T. Pike, acting chairman of the AEC, requested a ruling from the Honorable Lindsay C. Warren, Comptroller General of the United States.43Among the concerns discussed was the fear that indemnification might be limited by the amount of appropriations committed. As General Counsel for Western Electric, Walter Brown, explained: "The extent of the indemnity might be wholly inadequate for the sort of disaster that is possible." 44It was ultimately concluded that the Commission would assume responsibility for any liabilities of the contractor to third parties for personal or property damage, even though that damage might be the result of negligence on the part of the contractor or its employees. It was apparent that such a provision would be necessary to induce a contractor to perform the work or carry out the mandate of the statute.
Among the precedents used in reaching this conclusion was a decision made April 19, 1943 , involving a secret contract entered into in furtherance of the war effort. Contract 6-33801, held not objectionable, included an indemnity provision substantially similar to that negotiated between Western and the AEC and Sandia Corporation.45
After careful perusal of the issue, the Honorable Lindsay C. Warren ruled that his office would not object to inclusion of the indemnity provision in question as contained in Article VI of the contract. Furthermore, it was recognized that the government's obligations would not be subject to the ten million dollar authorization limit specified in Article V, and that additional appropriations might be necessary to discharge obligations incurred.4s
The Sandia contract contained other interesting aspects related either directly or indirectly to the Laboratory's mission and position as an instrument of the government. The responsibility for security, for example, was to rest with the Commission, due to the sensitive nature of atomic weapons. Sandia and Western, in accordance with the Commission's security regulations, agreed to safeguard restricted data, formerly restricted data, other types of classified matter, and protect against sabotage, espionage, and theft of documents and materials of intrinsic value.47
Still another provision required that "all drawings, designs, specifications, data, books of account, correspondence, and records and memoranda of every kind and description prepared by Sandia Corporation in connection with the performance of work should be preserved except as otherwise directed by the Commission." Furthermore, Sandia agreed to deliver these records to the Commission at its request.46
Contractual Modifications
Again, because of the nature of Sandia's business, and because the government considers that inventions made by employees of government contractors are the result of federally funded research, the patent provision of the 1949 contract favored the government. Accordingly, the Commission retained the sole power to determine whether or not and where a patent could be filed, as well as disposition of title rights to such inventions. Western also granted to the government an irrevocable, royalty-free, nonexclusive license for the entire term of its patents for use in Sandia Corporation products that utilized fissionable material or atomic energy in or with a military weapon. Similarly, the government granted AT&T a non-exclusive license to government-owned patents from Sandia.49
These patent provisions as agreed upon in the 1949 contract meant that if a Sandia employee, in the course of work, made or conceived an invention or discovery, the AEC would be furnished with the complete information thereon. The Commission would then determine whether or not a patent application should be filed. To effectuate such a contract provision, employees of Sandia would be required to sign patent agreements. If an individual wanted to obtain a patent in his or her own name, that person would be required to obtain a waiver from the government.
Because such patent provisions have favored the government and because of the basic no-profit, no-fee concept, AT&T has traditionally maintained an arms-length relationship toward Sandia. The 1949 contract, as noted, provided that AT&T would reap no benefit from sales or services, except for communications equipment. After almost four decades, effective with the October 1, 1983 contract, that limitation was deleted. AT&T can sell its products and services to Sandia. Thus, AT&T and Sandia can now do business, but only with government approval. 50 This contractual modification, the most significant yet to occur, is largely the result of the 1984 divestiture of AT&T. With divestiture, AT&T's business broadened. For the first time, AT&T is showing interest in participating with Sandia in technology transfer. Changes in Congressional patent laws helped pave the way.51
In the early 1980s, for example, legislative initiatives were undertaken in Congress to enable contractors such as the University of California to share in the technology developed at the Laboratories. For Sandia, however, changes in national patent law and changes in the 1983 contract (freeing AT&T from its self-imposed restrictions and allowing it to do business with Sandia) have made little impact. Nevertheless, the 1983 contractual modification does constitute the most significant change made during the Labs' forty-year existence and may have future ramifications for the Sandia-AT&T affiliation.52
One of the most difficult aspects of Sandia's legal situation for outsiders to comprehend is the fact that Sandia does not own land or property. Sandia headquarters in Albuquerque sits on a military reservation, and ownership of buildings and furnishings reside with the government. Sandia Corporation, in fact, has no assets other than the $1000 paid-in capital necessary for incorporation in the state of Delaware.
The story is told that in 1979 a visiting United States Marshall on legal business with the Laboratory, was taken to the office of the Treasurer and shown a box. The box, he was told, contained the sum total of the Corporation's assets-a bond for S1000. Looking around at the comfortable office, the man's face registered disbelief. Even after the Corporate attorney explained the situation, the Marshall found it difficult to comprehend.53
Today, the Laboratories' assets have increased, but not substantially. In addition to the S1000 US Savings Bond (held in the Office of the Assistant Treasurer), there are three additional Series E bonds issued in the amounts of S200, S100, and S25, which represent the accumulated interest on paid-in capital. Not to be overlooked is S6.25 in cash.
The financial provisos of the Sandia contract contribute to its uniqueness. The contract provides "full cost reimbursement" for expenditures with a single, narrow exception. This single exception pertains to controlling corporate officers for whose "willful misconduct or bad faith" reimbursement can be withheld. In comparison, other government contractors have a long list of exceptions. All financial obligations incurred by the Corporation are considered government obligations and Sandia, in fact, draws upon a government bank account.54
From the beginning, it was recognized that the effective operation of Sandia Corporation was all-important to the defense of the United States. its administrative and legal position was unique; there was little precedent for operating guidelines and procedures. The 1949 contract, therefore, had to form the basis for a mature body of knowledge in administration and applicable legal principles that was not yet in the textbooks. Its effectiveness and workability has been shown not only by the test of time, but also by the fact that the contract has maintained a basic continuity. The original contract, as initially negotiated between Western Electric and the government is still in use as indicated by the last three digits of the contract-789. And the essence of the contract can still be distilled into two to three pages.
The appendices have been lengthened considerably, not because of AT&T changes or requests, but because of changing government requirements reflecting new socioeconomic concerns such as cost accounting standards, promotion of small businesses, and equal employment opportunity. But the basic concept of the contract remains the same. Neither has the operating arrangement changed; Sandia is still managed by Western Electric, now called AT&T Technologies, incorporated.55
Credit for drafting such a viable document must go to those parties involved in the original contract negotiations, those individuals who forged legal tools out of raw facts to accomplish the necessary tasks. However, credit is also due negotiators of the contract renewals who have had the prudence to leave well enough alone. 
